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ABSTRACT
We advocate to create a spot Internet transit market, where
transit is sold using the under-utilized backbone capacity at
a lower price. The providers can improve profit by capital-
izing the perishable capacity, and customers can buy transit
on-demand without a minimum commitment level for elastic
traffic, and as a result improve its surplus (i.e. utility gains).
We conduct a systematic study of the economical benefits
of spot transit both theoretically and empirically. We pro-
pose a simple analytical framework with a general demand
function, and solve the pricing problem of maximizing the
expected profit, taking into account the revenue loss of reg-
ular transit when spot transit traffic hikes. We rigorously
prove the price advantage of spot transit, as well as profit
and surplus improvements for tier-1 ISPs and customers, re-
spectively. Using real-world price data and traffic statistics
of 6 IXPs with more than 1000 ISPs, we quantitatively eval-
uate spot transit and show that significant financial benefits
can be achieved in both absolute and relative terms, robust
to parameter values.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer-communications networks]: Network op-
erations; network management
General Terms
Economics, Design
Keywords
Network economics, Internet transit, pricing
1. INTRODUCTION
Internet transit has traditionally been traded with long-
term contracts, where the tier-1 ISP specifies pricing and
the transit customer commits a minimum level of bandwidth
consumption. Two facts make this market inefficient for to-
day’s Internet. First, tier-1 ISPs typically over-provision the
backbone and have a portion of the capacity under-utilized
most of the time [13], which represents a bulk of the missing
revenue opportunities. Second, the transit customers are in-
creasingly unwilling to purchase transit due to sheer costs of
serving the ever-increasing traffic volumes. Cisco estimates
that busy-hour Internet traffic will increase fivefold by 2015
while average traffic will increase fourfold [12].
In this paper, we advocate that a spot Internet transit mar-
ket should be created, where the unused transit capacity is
sold at a lower price to compliment the traditional contract-
based market. To serve the spot traffic, the tier-1 ISP uses
its under-utilized capacity that are otherwise wasted. It pro-
vides no QoS guarantee and support for spot transit, which
enables the tier-1 ISP to adopt a lower price and earn ex-
tra revenue from the available, yet perishable, bandwidth re-
source. It can also stop routing the spot traffic at any time,
when capacity is needed for regular transit or to handle net-
work failures.
The transit customers, on the other hand, have the flexi-
bility to buy transit on-demand at a discount. Spot transit
is ideal for elastic traffic [33]. For example, datacenters can
use it for the bulk backup and replication traffic across the
Internet [11, 19]. Eyeball ISPs can use it at demand valleys
to support time-dependent pricing [16]. A lower broadband
access price can then be advertised at valley periods, encour-
aging users to defer time-insensitive applications such as file
downloading, and even out the peak demand that are par-
ticularly costly. In short, they can better cope with traffic
fluctuations in a flexible and cost-efficient way.
Moreover, small ISPs that originally rely on various forms
of peering or buying from transit resellers [35, 39] can now
purchase spot transit to offload the elastic traffic, and enjoy
the reachability of a tier-1 backbone with lower costs. The
barrier of minimum committed data rates no longer exists.
Since it does not differentiate based on the protocol or user
type, spot transit is also less susceptible to network neutrality
concerns spawned by some instances of paid peering [1,39].
In this paper, we are primarily interested in the economic
aspect of the market, in particular, pricing and the resulting
profit for tier-1 ISPs and consumer surplus, i.e. utility gains,
for transit customers. Pricing is critical as it directly affects
the incentives of both sides to participate. We take the liberty
to envision that a spot market is technically feasible, and
conduct a systematic study of the economical benefits of spot
transit. The unique challenge of pricing here arises from
an intriguing interplay between the spot and regular transit
ar
X
iv
:1
30
9.
64
22
v1
  [
cs
.N
I] 
 25
 Se
p 2
01
3
2traffic, whose bits share the same backbone infrastructure.
When the ISP tries to lower the price to attract demand, it is
certainly possible that the increased spot traffic hogs up the
network and causes performance degradation to the regular
traffic. Therefore, the risk of demand overflow and its impact
on profit have to be explicitly taken into account.
We solve the spot transit pricing problem for expected
profit maximization of a tier-1 ISP under the classical addi-
tive random demand model [31], which we empirically vali-
dated using real inter-domain traffic. Further, we rigorously
prove that spot transit improves both profit and consumer
surplus, as long as it can be offered cheaper than regular
transit. It is therefore a win-win solution for both sides of
the market. We emphasize that all our theoretical results are
obtained with a general demand function that captures the
essential properties of any demand function. Essentially, the
benefits of spot transit only depend on the characteristics of
elastic traffic.
To quantitatively understand the potential of spot transit in
the real world, we perform an extensive empirical evaluation
based on traffic traces collected from 6 Internet eXchange
Points (IXPs) in America, Europe, and Asia. The dataset
of each IXP contains aggregated traffic statistics from more
than 100 ISPs with peak demand between 1200 Gbps and
around 200 Gbps. We use two canonical demand functions
with real transit prices, empirical demand elasticity data, and
a range of model parameters. It is demonstrated that, spot
transit is typically 15%-30% cheaper, with more than 60%
profit improvement for tier-1 ISPs and more than 10% sur-
plus improvement for customers. On dollar terms, the profit
and surplus gains are in the order of millions (monthly) for
large IXPs and hundreds of thousands for smaller ones. The
benefit is robust in the sense that a 10% profit and surplus
improvement is still observed even in the worst case.
We make three original contributions. First, we propose
spot transit, a transit market that allows customers to buy un-
derutilized transit capacity on-demand at a discounted price
(Sec. 2). Second, we propose a simple and practical ana-
lytical framework that strikes a balance between economic
theory and realistic aspects of Internet transit. With a gen-
eral demand function (Sec. 3), we characterize the optimal
price as a function of the provision cost, overflow penalty,
demand elasticity, and the predictability of traffic. We the-
oretically establish the price advantage and efficiency gains
of spot transit (Sec. 4). Third, we empirically evaluate spot
transit using real traffic statistics and price data. We validate
our demand model, and obtain realistic parameters for de-
mand functions by fitting empirical traffic data into canoni-
cal economic models, and compellingly demonstrate the sig-
nificant benefits of spot transit (Sec. 5). Towards the end, we
discuss practical issues towards implementing such a market
(Sec. 6).
2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
The Internet backbone consists of a small number of tier-
1 ISPs, each owning a portion of the global infrastructure,
and can reach the entire Internet solely via settlement-free
interconnection, i.e. peering. They provide transit services
to transit customers for monetary returns. It is widely known
that the tier-1 backbone is largely under-utilized (under 50%)
due to over-provisioning [13]. Over recent years, though
traffic has been growing at a 40%–50% annual rate [12, 18],
backbone capacity has been increasing worldwide at an equiv-
alent pace according to [37]. As a result, underutilization
continues to exist, with average and peak link utilization on
major backbone lines stay virtually unchanged [36].
The under-utilized backbone capacity represents a bulk of
missing revenue opportunities for tier-1 ISPs. Network ca-
pacity is inherently a perishable resource: bandwidth that is
not used is lost forever. On the other hand, despite the con-
stant decline of transit prices [37], customers face enormous
transit costs due to the rapid-growing traffic. New forms of
peering [39] and smart traffic engineering schemes [19, 40]
are continuously being developed to cut the transit bill. This
demonstrates the inefficiency of the current market, and calls
for novel solutions that offer better ways of trading transit.
Motivated by these observations, we propose to create a
spot transit market, where the unused capacity is sold at a
discount without SLAs regarding network availability, route
stability, etc. Transit customers can purchase spot transit on-
demand without entering a contract first. The spot transit
market compliments the regular contract based market. It
suits well to serve the elastic traffic, such as the bulk replica-
tion and backup traffic across datacenters and most residen-
tial broadband traffic, because it can tolerate delay and loss
and is much more price sensitive [39].
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(a) Regular transit at $5/Mbps (b) Spot transit at $3/Mbps
Figure 1: The benefits of the spot transit market. It im-
proves the social welfare by improving the revenue for
tier-1 ISPs, and surplus for transit customers. The de-
mand curve shown is D = 1313.26 · p−1.6.
To intuitively see the potential of spot transit market, Fig-
ure 1 shows a typical iso-elastic demand curve [24, 39] for a
tier-1 ISP’s elastic traffic. We choose the demand function
such that at a regular transit price of $5/Mbps, the elastic
traffic is 100 Gbps. The revenue is $500,000 per month. If
the demand were to be served by the spot transit market,
since the tier-1 ISP does not need to provide QoS guaran-
tees, it can afford a lower price of, say, $3/Mbps, with a
40% discount. At such a low price, demand rises to around
226.4 Gbps, and our tier-1 ISP collects around $680,000.
3Thus, by creating the spot transit market and optimizing price,
the tier-1 ISP attains a 36% profit increase. This represents
a strong financial incentive.
The spot transit market also benefits transit customers in
terms of consumer surplus, which is the difference between
the total amount that they are willing to pay and the actual
amount that they do pay at the market price [22]. As depicted
in Figure 1, consumer surplus is greatly improved with a
lower transit price.
Therefore, the spot market achieves higher efficiency and
improves social welfare. The underlying reason is that in the
conventional transit market, elastic traffic is priced together
with inelastic traffic that has higher costs to serve. By pric-
ing the elastic traffic separately with spot transit that has no
SLAs, tier-1 ISPs are able to adopt a lower price, which in
turns attracts even more demand and increases profit.
The demand increase with spot transit can be explained
by at least two factors: competition with peering and transit
reselling. The low price and on-demand feature of spot tran-
sit can make it more appealing than peering or paid peering,
considering the performance benefits and network reacha-
bility provided by the tier-1 backbone. Further, small ISPs
usually find it difficult to purchase transit directly from tier-1
ISPs due to the minimum committed data rate requirement,
and rely on transit resellers instead. With spot transit, tier-1
ISPs are able to collect additional profits from these small
ISPs by bypassing the transit resellers in the middle. In all,
we expect that spot transit compliments the traditional transit
business of a tier-1 ISP.
3. MODEL
In this section, we introduce the theoretical model for our
analysis of the optimal pricing, and the benefits of spot tran-
sit.
3.1 Spot transit market
We consider a spot transit market with multiple tier-1 ISPs.
This corresponds to an oligopoly scenario. Numerous game
models can be adopted [22] and each considers specific com-
petition scenarios. Our objective is to study spot transit un-
der a general model that captures the key aspects of the mar-
ket. For the applicability of results and ease of exposition,
we choose to focus on a representative tier-1 ISP, with the
residual demand that is not met by other competitors in the
market. Residual demand is a common concept in microeco-
nomics in studying the pricing problem for a firm operating
in a competitive market [24, 39].
Though residual demand does not model the full dynamic
interactions between ISPs, it accounts for the availability of
substitutes and switching costs. It also allows a faithful em-
pirical verification, since the real-world price and demand
data collected reflect the effect of competition. The same
approach is also adopted in [39].
3.2 Demand
Figure 2: Weekly and monthly aggregated traffic at NIX,
an Internet exchange in Czech [26].
One of the challenges of conducting economic analysis in
networking is the lack of a good model for the residual de-
mand, or simply demand, in general. Not much public infor-
mation is known about the Internet transit market in particu-
lar for business reasons. Here we blend theory with practice,
and use classical demand models from economics with em-
pirical justifications based on real traffic data. We believe
such an approach not only makes the analysis tractable, but
also the results practically relevant.
3.2.1 A model for billable demand
We define spot transit demand D as the actual billable
amount of bandwidth, i.e. the 95-percentile demand. Other
pricing schemes, such as volume pricing, can be studied in a
similar way. The aggregated traffic of a tier-1 ISP often ex-
hibits a diurnal pattern with high predictability [13, 30]. For
example Figure 2 plots the aggregated traffic at the Neutral
Internet eXchange (NIX) in Czech Republic [26]. The di-
urnal pattern is clearly visible in both weekly and monthly
scales. Naturally, one can thus employ statistical methods
over traffic time series to estimate the billable demand, with
a small error that arises from the inherent randomness of de-
mand.
Inspired by this observation, we adopt the classical ap-
proach in economics [31] to model the uncertainty of bill-
able demand in an additive fashion. Specifically,
D(p, ) = d(p) + , (1)
following [23]. Here, p is the spot transit price in $/Mbps,
d(p) is the price-dependent demand function that models the
billable demand (more details in Sec. 3.2.2), and  is a ran-
dom variable defined over [A,B] to model the inherent de-
mand uncertainty. Thus randomness in demand is price inde-
pendent. That is, the shape of the demand curve is indepen-
dent of the price, while the mean and variance of the demand
distribution are affected by the price. We provide empirical
justifications for our demand model using real-world traffic
data in Sec. 5.2.
3.2.2 Demand function d(p) and elasticity
4Many demand functions d(p) are valid in economic anal-
ysis. Instead of choosing some specific functions to work
with, our analysis assumes a general demand function. We
only require that d(p) is a continuous, twice differentiable,
decreasing, and convex function, i.e. d′(p) < 0, d′′(p) ≥ 0.
Monotonicity and convexity are general characteristics of
the demand-price interaction. These assumptions are quite
reasonable and commonly accepted in the literature.
A useful concept related to demand is its elasticity. Elas-
ticity measures the responsiveness of demand to a change in
price, and is defined at a price point p as
σ(p) = −p · d
′(p)
d(p)
. (2)
We can observe that
σ′(p) ≥ 0 (3)
since d′(p) < 0 and d′′(p) ≥ 0, i.e. elasticity is non-decreasing
in p.
Next we show two canonical demand functions that sat-
isfy our assumptions.
Iso-elastic demand. The iso-elastic demand, or constant
elasticity demand, is a well-known demand function derived
from the alpha-fair utility function [24, 39], which is often
used to model Internet user activity. As the name suggests,
elasticity is constant for every price point.
d(p) = v · p−α, v > 0, α > 1. (4)
v can be interpreted as the base demand that controls the
magnitude of demand. σ(p) = α, where α denotes the con-
stant elasticity: a higher value represents higher elasticity.
As discussed above, demand here is the residual demand,
and high elasticity can also indicate that the market is more
competitive, and substitutes are readily available.
Linear demand. The simple linear function of demand is
also popular [22]:
d(p) = v − αp, v > 0, α > 0. (5)
Here v is the base demand. Elasticity of linear demand is
σ(p) = αpv−αp . In contrast to iso-elastic demand, now elas-
ticity decreases in price. Thus it captures the phenomena that
sometimes, demand is less sensitive to a price change when
the price is already low (recall (3)).
3.3 Surplus, profit, and social welfare
To comprehensively study the economical benefits of spot
transit we consider three metrics, namely consumer surplus,
provider profit, and social welfare. As we have seen from
Figure 1, consumer surplus, or simply surplus is the utility
gain obtained by customers due to the purchase of Internet
transit. Specifically,
S(p) =
∫ ∞
p
(x− p)d(x)dx. (6)
In other words, the surplus equals the amount customers are
willing to pay, minus the actual cost of purchase at p. It is
evident that S(p) increases as p decreases, i.e. a price reduc-
tion is always beneficial for customers.
Next we characterize provider profit as a function of the
spot transit price p. We consider the scenario where the tier-1
ISP allocates a fixed portion of the unused backbone band-
width to offer spot transit services. This amount is defined as
the capacity of spot transit C, and can be safely used with-
out affecting the ISP’s regular business. A proper choice of
C can be determined by the ISP profiling its network utiliza-
tion.
The notion of capacity here is not a rigid resource con-
straint. Since demand is inherently random and both the spot
and regular transit traffic share the same backbone, nothing
prevents the spot traffic from breaking through the capacity
C and using the capacity reserved for regular transit. Such a
demand overflow scenario may negatively affect the regular
transit traffic and thus the ISP’s revenue. To model the rev-
enue loss, a penalty of m > 0 in $/Mbps is incurred when-
ever demand exceeds the capacity, i.e. D(p, ) > C. An
equivalent interpretation is to treat it as modeling the sur-
plus loss of the regular transit customers due to overflow.
m > pC , where pC denotes the price at which d(p) = C.
Thus, the penalty is large enough so that at the optimal op-
erating point, the expected demand is smaller than C.
We let f(·) denote the probability density function of the
demand uncertainty  defined over [A,B]. In practice  can
often be approximated by a Gaussian random variable. To
make sure that positive demand is possible, we require B <
C which holds naturally since the randomness is small in
magnitude compared to capacity. These assumptions will
also be verified using real traffic traces in Sec. 5.2.
We can now formally define the spot transit profit. If
demand does not exceed the capacity, then profit is sim-
ply (p − r)D(p, ), where r > 0 is the unit cost of spot
transit. Otherwise the profit consists of a positive compo-
nent from serving the spot transit and a negative compo-
nent representing the demand overflow loss, and is written
as (p − r)D(p, ) − m(D(p, ) − C). The profit function,
R(p, ) can then be expressed as
R(p, ) =
{
(p− r)(d(p) + ),  ≤ C − d(p)
(p− r −m)(d(p) + ) +mC,  > C − d(p)
The expected profit is:
E[R(p)] =
(p− r)d(p)−m
∫ B
C−d(p)
(d(p)− C + u)f(u)du (7)
Define Φ(p) = (p− r)d(p), and Λ(p) = m ∫ B
C−d(p)(d(p)−
C+u)f(u)du. Φ(p) represents the risk-free profit when de-
mand is deterministic. Λ(p) is the loss function at an average
cost of m when demand overflow happens. The overall ex-
pected profit is the difference between the two.
E[R(p)] = Φ(p)− Λ(p), (8)
5Finally, the social welfare of a market is defined as the
sum of consumer surplus and provider profit. For the spot
transit market, its social welfare Ψ(p) is
Ψ(p) = S(p) + E[R(p)]. (9)
4. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
In this section, we present our analysis on the optimal
pricing of spot transit for profit maximization, as well as the
resulting profit, surplus and social welfare, to theoretically
demonstrate its benefits.
4.1 Pricing for profit maximization
With spot transit, the very first question we need to answer
is, how do we price it? Our ISP needs to determine a price
to maximize its expected profit with the presence of demand
uncertainty, taking into account the risk of demand overflow
and its monetary impact. The profit maximization problem
can then be formulated:
max
p
E[R(p)] (10)
s.t. (7)
For efficient price determination, the optimization prob-
lem must have an efficient solution algorithm. The most
useful criterion for this property is convexity: minimizing
a convex function, or equivalently maximizing a concave
function over a convex constraint set. However, we show
that this condition is not satisfied for our problem.
Consider the first-order derivative of E[R(p)], which can
be obtained by applying the Leibniz integral rule:
E′[R(p)] = d(p)+d′(p)
(
p− r −m · Pr ( > C − d(p))) .
(11)
It can be observed that the term in (·) is positive and de-
creasing in p, and thus the term −(·)d′(p) is decreasing in
p. However, d(p) + p · d′(p) is not monotonically increas-
ing or decreasing. Therefore, E[R(p)] is neither convex nor
concave in p.
Luckily, we can still prove that the first-order optimality
condition E′[R(p)] = 0 is a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for the optimization (10), with a very mild assumption
of quasiconcavity.
Definition 1. A function g(x) is (strict) quasiconcave if
and only g′(x)(x′ − x) > 0 whenever g(x′) > g(x) (p.934,
[22]).
That is, a quasiconcave function is either decreasing, in-
creasing, or there exists x∗ such that g is decreasing for
x < x∗ and increasing for x > x∗. Thus, quasiconcavity
is a generalization and relaxation of concavity. If a func-
tion is not monotone, quasiconcavity guarantees that it has
a unique global maximum. In other words, it alleviates the
burden of considering the second-order condition by ensur-
ing that the sufficient first-order condition is necessary even
without the strong concavity assumption [6, 22].
Lemma 1. E[R(p)] as in (7) is quasiconcave with the
general demand function d(p).
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Therefore, we can efficiently solve the optimal pricing
problem by setting the first-order derivative of E[R(p)] to
zero.
Theorem 1. The optimal price price p∗ of the profit max-
imization problem (10) is determined uniquely as the solu-
tion to the first-order condition, i.e.
p∗ = r +m · Pr ( > C − d(p∗))− d(p∗)
d′(p∗)
. (12)
For example, the optimal price of iso-elastic demand (4)
satisfies
p∗ =
α
α− 1
(
r +m · Pr ( > C − v(p∗)−α)) . (13)
The optimal price of linear demand (5) satisfies
2p∗ = r +m · Pr ( > C − v + αp∗)+ v
α
. (14)
Several interesting and economically satisfying observa-
tions can be made from Theorem 1. First, the optimal price
p∗ increases with the provision cost r, which is straightfor-
ward. Second, p∗ also increases with the overflow penalty
m. Third, p∗ increases with − d(p∗)d′(p∗) , which equals p
∗
σ(p∗)
from (2). That is, the ISP can set a high price if demand elas-
ticity is low due to weak market competition or the unique-
ness of its service, and vice versa. Finally, we can see that
p∗ > p′, where p′ is the profit maximizing price without
demand uncertainty (m = 0). It shows that with demand un-
certainty, a tier-1 ISP needs to charge a higher price in order
to cover the damage of demand overflow.
Having solved the pricing problem, we now would like
to study the price advantage of spot transit, i.e. whether, or
when it can be offered at a cheaper price than regular tran-
sit. To address this question, we need to first understand the
regular transit price, which is set prior to the introduction
of spot transit. For a rational tier-1 ISP, we can interpret p¯
as the profit maximizing price for the aggregated traffic de-
mand d¯(p) when it is solely served by the regular transit,
which amounts to the following:
p¯ = arg max (p− r¯)d¯(p), (15)
where r¯ is the provision cost of regular transit. Notice that
although regular and spot transit share the same infrastruc-
ture cost, r¯ > r because spot transit does not have any QoS
support or financial overhead of contract negotiation. Since
d¯(p) includes both inelastic and elastic traffic demand, its
elasticity is smaller, i.e. σ¯(p) < σ(p) for any p. Then we
can prove the following.
Theorem 2. p∗ < p¯, i.e. the spot transit price is less
than the regular transit price, if the following is satisfied:
r ≤ r¯ −m (1− σ(p∗)−1) θ2
θ2 + (C − d(p∗)− µ)2 , (16)
6where µ and θ are the mean and standard deviation of ,
respectively.
The proof is in Appendix B. Theorem 2 confirms the intu-
ition that spot transit is cheaper than regular transit as long as
the cost difference between them is large enough. The condi-
tion (16) is sufficient but not necessary. It is easy to satisfy,
since r < r¯ always holds and
(
1− σ(p∗)−1)1 is small in
practice. The term θ
2
θ2+(C−d(p∗)−µ)2 bounds the tail proba-
bility Pr( > C−d(p∗)), and is also small given the demand
randomness , i.e. its standard deviation θ is small. There-
fore, theoretically, spot transit can be offered at a discount in
most of the cases with a general demand function.
We wish to emphasize that this result depends only on
two defining characteristics of elastic traffic that spot transit
serves, i.e. low cost (16) and high elasticity σ(p) > σ¯(p). As
will be shown soon in Sec. 4.2, they also guarantee the eco-
nomical efficiency gains of spot transit. This demonstrates
the generality of our results that does not depend on the spe-
cific forms the demand function may take.
4.2 Surplus, profit, and social welfare
Now we turn to analyzing the efficiency of the spot transit
market. We seek to answer the question: at the optimal price
p∗, can spot transit improve surplus, profit, and eventually
social welfare?
Without loss of generality, we assume that p∗ < p¯ holds.
First, as discussed in Sec. 3.3, surplus increases when price
decreases, and the following follows from Theorem 2.
Lemma 2. S(p∗) > S(p¯).
That is, spot transit improves surplus for elastic traffic given
its price advantage. Thus it is beneficial for customers.
Next from the provider’s perspective, we wish to know
whether spot transit is more attractive than regular transit for
elastic traffic. That is, whether the optimal profit is larger
than that using regular transit. Without spot transit, the ex-
pected profit that could be collected from elastic traffic at the
regular transit price p¯ is:
E[R(p¯)] = (p¯− r¯)d(p¯), (17)
where d(p¯) is the demand that would occur at p¯.
Lemma 3. E[R(p∗)] > E[R(p¯)].
The proof is in Appendix C. This lemma confirms that the
spot transit market is not only beneficial for customers, but
also profitable for ISPs, as long as it can be offered at a lower
price than the regular transit. The reason of the profitability
is that since elastic traffic is more price sensitive, a price
reduction can potentially attract more demand and the end
result is a net profit increase despite the negative impact of
demand overflow on regular transit.
Combining Lemma 2 and 3 we have
1σ(p∗) > 1 because price reduction is only possible to generate
positive gains if demand increases at least proportionally in re-
sponse.
Theorem 3. Φ(p∗) > Φ(p¯). Spot transit improves social
welfare by improving consumer surplus and ISP profit.
Therefore, we have theoretically proved that spot transit is
more efficient than the conventional market for elastic traf-
fic, taking into account demand uncertainty and the overflow
loss. Both ISPs and transit customers have clear incentives
to participate in this new market. Given the flexibility in pur-
chasing, spot transit represents an economically viable and
attractive market solution for Internet transit, especially for
elastic traffic. Our analysis is valid for general demand func-
tions, and can be expected to hold in most realistic cases.
5. EVALUATION
In this section, we present an empirical evaluation of spot
transit based on real-world operational traffic information
we collected from 6 representative Internet eXchange Points
(IXPs) located in America, Europe, and Asia. One signif-
icant hurdle of network economic analysis is the lack of
empirical data. ISPs, especially tier-1 ISPs, are reluctant
to share their traffic data publicly. A few European ISPs
serving academic institutions do publish their traffic statis-
tics online. Their size, traffic volume, and characteristics,
however, do not faithfully reflect those of the tier-1 ISPs.
We use the traffic statistics of large IXPs to represent the
tier-1 ISP traffic. IXPs are physical infrastructure facilities
through which ISPs peer with each other. They are located in
key hub locations around the world, and serve a significant
portion of the Internet traffic [18]. A large IXP typically has
over one hundred member ISPs, and interconnecting hun-
dreds of Gb/s commercial, academic, and residential traffic.
Thus the scale and traffic characteristics are similar to those
of a tier-1 ISP.
Though IXPs solely serve peering traffic, empirically it
has been verified that peering and transit traffic share similar
temporal patterns with respect to peak times, peak-to-valley
ratios, etc. [35]. Essentially, both are driven by the same
end-user behavior, and it is intuitive that they are statisti-
cally similar. Thus, we believe the first-order estimation of
transit traffic using peering traffic of IXPs is appropriate as
a starting point of our performance evaluation. In the fol-
lowing, we use the IXP traffic to represent the regular transit
demand d¯(p¯) at the regular transit price for tier-1 ISPs.
5.1 Dataset description
IXP data is more accessible since many publish their ag-
gregate traffic statistics online. Usually the incoming and
outgoing traffic time series are reported and updated every 5
minutes. We manually inspect the webpages of large IXPs
[4], and handpick 6 representative ones across the globe that
publish traffic statistics using the standard mrtg/rrdtool
visualization tool [5] with a reasonable time granularity2.
2Some large IXPs, such as Deutscher IX, Amsterdam IX, and JP-
NAP only publish daily and/or yearly traffic stats that are too coarse
to analyze.
7IXP Acronym Country # of members Peak (Gbps) Average (Gbps) Error mean µ Error s.d. θ
London IX [20] LINX (LN) U.K. 407 1200 797.1 -15.9278 174.8157
Moscow IX [25] MSKIX (MSK) Russia 353 688.5 416 2.2313 115.0810
Neutral IX (Prague) [26] NIX (N) Czech 54 217.8 129.6 -1.2458 30.2338
New York International IX [27] NYIIX (NY) U.S. 128 205.9 157.7 3.9486 26.0743
Spain IX [34] ESPANIX (ES) Spain 58 198 172.5 -1.0476 22.3824
Hong Kong IX [15] HKIX (HK) China 168 180 119.8 1.7689 22.0919
Table 1: IXPs studied and statistics of their traffic and week-ahead prediction errors.
We crawl the websites of these IXPs to collect the weekly
aggregated traffic statistics images. All the data is collected
in 2012 and is more recent than the dataset in [35]. Table 1
lists all the IXPs we studied in this paper.
Traffic data is published as png images using mrtg, and
is not readily available in numerical forms. We follow the
approach of [35] to use an optical character recognition (OCR)
program to read the png images and output the numeric
array containing the traffic time series. Each IXP uses a
slightly different mrtg configuration, including the size, bit
depth, and color representation. Thus, we modified the soft-
ware provided by [35] to handle each IXP’s png image in-
dividually. The raw image files, the numeric data, and the
software for converting png images are available in [3]. The
basic traffic information is shown in Table 1.
5.2 Demand model validation
As a first step, we conduct an empirical validation of our
demand model stated in Sec. 3.2.1. Recall from (1) that we
model the 95-percentile demand as the sum of the demand
function d(p) and a random variable  to model the uncer-
tainty. Since the aggregated traffic has a clear diurnal pat-
tern, an intuitive justification of this model can be provided if
the ISP can accurately estimate its 95-th percentile demand
based on the traffic time series, with a small error term to
account for the unpredictable dynamics that corresponds to
 [7, 30].
We assume that the tier-1 ISP of interest uses the most
recent history to estimate/predict the future demand time se-
ries, the simplest regression method [7]. Once the entire time
series can be predicted, its 95-percentile can be readily ob-
tained. More complex algorithms can yield more accurate
prediction for a longer time window [30], which is beyond
the focus of this paper. Thus, if the prediction window size
is T , the future demand at time t is Dt = Dt−T .
We run this week-ahead prediction on all 6 IXPs. Figure 3
and 4 show the week-ahead (T = 7 days) prediction result of
LINX and NIX traffic for an example. We can observe that
simple week-ahead prediction based on the most recent his-
tory is fairly accurate. Figure 5 and 6 show the Q-Q plots of
the prediction errors. They lie closely on a linear line, sug-
gesting that the error term  behaves much like a Gaussian
random variable.
The error mean µ and standard deviation θ for the week-
ahead prediction on all 6 IXPs are shown in Table 1. The
mean is close to zero and the standard deviation is small
compared to the predicted data. Since the demand series can
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diction of the NIX traffic.
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Figure 6: Q-Q plot of week-
ahead prediction error on
the NIX trace.
be accurately predicted with a small error, the 95-percentile
demand can be readily calculated with the same error statis-
tics. This validates our demand model.
Note that although the IXP data contains both elastic and
inelastic traffic, essentially our demand model is based upon
the observation that demand of a tier-1 ISP is highly pre-
dictable due to multiplexing, which is valid for both traffic
types. We use the 95-percentile traffic from the IXP data to
represent the aggregated regular transit demand d¯(p¯) at the
regular price p¯. We adjust β ∈ [0.2, 0.7] to obtain elastic
traffic out of the aggregated, where β denotes the relative
proportion of elastic traffic. µ and θ then scales linearly with
β.
The validation result also suggests that  can be modeled
as a Gaussian random variable. Thus we let A = µ − 3θ
and B = µ + 3θ so that it contains more than 99% of the
probability mass and results in reasonably good numerical
accuracy and approximation [31]. The spot transit capacity
C is set to (0.4 + β) times the aggregated regular transit de-
mand d¯(p¯) throughout the evaluation. For a backbone with
peak utilization of 50%, the underutilized capacity equals
d¯(p¯). 50%–110% of this underutilized capacity is thus safe
to be used for spot transit. We believe such setting repre-
sents a typical operating environment of spot transit. One
can readily verify that B < C holds as assumed in Sec. 3.3.
8Note that we have used the simplest prediction algorithm,
and the result is therefore only a lower bound. With more
complex algorithms one can obtain more accurate prediction
for a longer time window [30], which is beyond the focus of
this paper. The prediction techniques and the line of reason-
ing apply to both elastic and inelastic traffic. We emphasize
that our demand uncertainty model is dependent only on the
observation that demand at a tier-1 ISP is highly predictable.
5.3 Obtaining cost and demand parameters from
data
After validating the model, the next key step is to obtain
cost and demand parameters in our model. Our analysis in
Sec. 4 is applicable to general demand functions. In the eval-
uation we use two common demand functions, iso-elastic
and linear demand as in Sec. 3.2.2. To derive model parame-
ters for them, we use the Q2 2011 median GigE transit price
in New York, London, and Hong Kong published in [37] as
the regular transit price p¯ in America, Europe, and Asia. Ta-
ble 2 lists the price data.
First, to obtain the cost of regular transit r¯, since now we
know the regular transit demand d¯(p¯) and p¯, assuming ISPs
are rational and profit-maximizing, from (22) we can obtain
r¯ = p¯
(
1− 1
α¯
)
(18)
for iso-elastic demand with (4), and
r¯ = p¯− d¯(p¯)
α¯
(19)
for linear demand with (5). Studies have shown that the more
elastic residential Internet traffic has an elasticity of around
2.7 for cable and DSL [8]. We thus assume the demand elas-
ticity α¯ = 2 in (18) for aggregated traffic, i.e. dr¯ = 0.5p¯.
Since r¯ is invariant across two demand models, we can sub-
stitute r¯ into (19) to obtain α¯ for linear demand in different
continents.
To obtain demand parameters, we first multiply β ∈ [0.2, 0.7]
to d¯(p¯) to calculate the elastic traffic demand at the regular
price d(p¯) from the IXP dataset. Then from (4) and (5) we
know that as long as the demand sensitivity parameter α is
known we can obtain the base demand
v = d(p¯) · p¯α (20)
for iso-elastic demand and
v = d(p¯) + αp¯ (21)
for linear demand. The entire elastic demand curve d(p)
can then be obtained. We use a range of values for γ > 1
to control the relative elasticity of spot transit versus reg-
ular transit, in order to evaluate the effect of elasticity on
the benefits of spot transit. For iso-elastic demand, α corre-
sponds directly to elasticity, and α = γα¯ so that spot transit
is γ more sensitive. For linear demand, since α also affects
the demand magnitude, we have to first scale it down by β,
i.e. α = β · γα¯.
Table 2: The regular transit prices in major Internet ex-
change locations [37].
Location Price p¯ ($USD/Mbps)
London 7.5
New York 7
Hong Kong 22
We stress that the purpose of evaluation is to verify the
analysis in Sec. 4 and gain insights on the potential of spot
transit in a realistic setting. We do not claim the numerical
accuracy of the results obtained here for tier-1 ISPs. The ex-
act pricing and monetary benefits heavily depend on various
factors and can only be calculated on a case-by-case basis.
5.4 Overall benefits
First and foremost, we evaluate the overall benefits of spot
transit with typical parameter setting. For both demand mod-
els, we set γ = 1.25, r = 0.5r¯, and m = p¯ so that elastic
traffic, i.e. spot transit demand, is 1.25 times more sensitive
than regular transit, cost is half of the regular cost, and over-
flow penalty is equal to regular price. β = [0.2, 0.7], and
the capacity C = (0.4 + β)d¯(p¯). For a backbone with peak
utilization of 50%, the underutilized capacity equals d¯(p¯).
50%-110% of this underutilized capacity is thus safe to be
used for spot transit. We believe such setting represents a
typical operating environment of spot transit. Figure 7-16
show the evaluation results of all 6 IXPs for both demand
models.
Figure 7 and 10 plot the normalized spot transit price p∗p¯
for both demand models. Observe that spot transit is offered
at a discount, ranging from more than 30% to 15%. This
demonstrates the price advantage of spot transit. Price in-
creases with β, suggesting that as relative proportion of elas-
tic traffic increases, demand overflow probability increases
since cost, penalty, and elasticity does not change with β
here. Figure 8 and 11 show the profit improvement of spot
transit. We can see that spot transit significantly improves
tier-1 ISP’s profit, by 80%-130% with iso-elastic demand,
and by 63%-65% with linear demand. Same observation can
be made in terms of consumer surplus as shown in Figure 14
and 16. Spot transit improves surplus by 10%-40% with
iso-elastic demand, and by 120%-200% with linear demand.
Since price increases with β, the improvement decreases as
a result.
One may wonder at this point, what is the exact dollar
amount of spot transit’s benefits? Figure 13 and 16 plot the
absolute profit and surplus gain for iso-elastic demand, and
Figure 14 and 15 plot the absolute gains for linear demand,
respectively. The profit gain stands more than $1 million for
large IXPs like LINX, and in the order of hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars for smaller ones like NIX, NYIIX and ES-
PANIX for both models. The absolute surplus gain depends
more on the shape of demand curve, and is more salient with
iso-elastic demand that allows price to go to infinity. Again
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Figure 7: Optimal spot price with iso-
elastic demand.
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Figure 8: Profit improvement with iso-
elastic demand.
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Figure 9: Surplus improvement with
iso-elastic demand.
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Figure 10: Optimal spot price with lin-
ear demand.
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Figure 11: Profit improvement with lin-
ear demand.
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Figure 12: Surplus improvement with
linear demand.
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Figure 13: Profit gain of
spot transit with iso-elastic
demand.
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Figure 14: Surplus gain of
spot transit with iso-elastic
demand.
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Figure 15: Profit gain of
spot transit with linear de-
mand.
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Figure 16: Surplus gain of
spot transit with linear de-
mand.
the gain is in the order of million dollars for large IXPs, and
hundreds of thousands of dollars for smaller ones. Thus,
our evaluation not only confirms the qualitative analysis in
Sec. 4.2, but also quantitatively shows that spot transit of-
fers significant financial incentives with more than $1 mil-
lion dollars of gains possible (monthly) for both tier-1 ISPs
and transit customers, depending on the size of the ISP.
Another interesting observation from the results is that,
the smallest IXP, HKIX, enjoys more dramatic performance
improvement than others despite its relatively small scale,
especially in terms of consumer surplus. The reason is that
the regular transit price in Asia and other more remote areas
of Internet is much higher than other regions, resulting in a
much larger profit margin in $/Mbps for tier-1 ISPs. Thus,
with the same price discount, its profit and surplus gains are
more profound than bigger IXPs in major cities of Europe
and America. This illustrates that spot transit is potentially
more attractive in “remote” regions of Internet where regular
transit is much more expensive.
5.5 Pricing analysis
Now we the effect of various parameters on spot transit
pricing. We choose to present results with iso-elastic de-
mand since both models lead to similar conclusions.
Figure 17-19 show how spot transit price is affected by
cost r, penalty m, and elasticity α, respectively. We vary the
relative cost r/r¯ between 0.1 and 0.9 with m = p¯ and γ =
10
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Figure 17: The effect of r on spot price
with iso-elastic demand.
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Figure 18: The effect ofm on spot price
with iso-elastic demand.
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Figure 19: The effect of γ on spot price
with iso-elastic demand.
1.25, relative penalty m/p¯ between 0.5 and 1.5 with r =
0.5r¯ and γ = 1.25, and relative elasticity γ between 1.1 and
2 with r = 0.5r¯ andm = p¯. Other parameter settings remain
the same as in the previous section. We observe that spot
price increases with all of the three factors, as expected from
Theorem 1. Price is less sensitive to penalty m compared
to cost and elasticity, since penalty is only imposed on the
overflown portion of demand. Also from Figure 17 we can
see that when r ≥ 0.4r¯, r¯ − r ≤ 0.6r¯ = 0.3p¯ < 0.5m(1 −
1
2∗1.25 ) = 0.3p¯, spot transit price is still offered at more than
15% discount. This confirms our discussion of Theorem 2
in Sec. 4.1 that even when the condition r ≤ r¯ − 0.5m(1−
σ(p∗)−1) is not satisfied, i.e. when the cost difference is
not large, spot transit can still be much cheaper than regular
transit, and improves the overall efficiency of the market as
proved in Theorem 3.
5.6 Sensitivity analysis
We have studied how cost r, penalty m, and elasticity
α affect spot transit pricing. In this section, we analyze
how these model parameters affect the profit and surplus im-
provement of spot transit.
First we vary r and m individually as we did in the previ-
ous section, and plot the profit and surplus improvement with
iso-elastic demand in Figure 20-23. Observe that as cost r
and penalty m increase, both profit and surplus drop which
is intuitive to understand. Spot transit is able to provide posi-
tive improvement even when r = 0.9r¯ orm = 1.5p¯. Results
of linear demand are similar and not presented.
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Figure 20: Profit improve-
ment vs. r with iso-elastic
demand.
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Figure 21: Surplus im-
provement vs. r with iso-
elastic demand.
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Figure 22: Profit improve-
ment vs. m with iso-elastic
demand.
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Figure 23: Surplus im-
provement vs. m with iso-
elastic demand.
We then vary elasticity α by varying γ between 1.1 and 2.
Figure 24-25 show the corresponding profit and surplus im-
provement. We can see that although a larger α increases
spot transit prices, it also increases the profit and surplus
gains at the same time, which is in sharp contrary to the re-
sults of cost and penalty. The reason for the discrepancy is
that increasing α does not change cost and penalty of spot
transit, and as a result the profit margin is actually increased
due to the price increase. From the numerical result we also
observe that demand at p∗ also increases despite the price
increase because the elasticity now is larger. The overall ef-
fect of increased elasticity therefore is positive, in spite of
slightly increased revenue loss due to demand overflow ei-
ther.
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Figure 24: Profit improve-
ment vs. γ with iso-elastic
demand.
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Figure 25: Surplus im-
provement vs. γ with iso-
elastic demand.
Finally, we study a worst-case scenario, where all the three
parameters are deliberately chosen to represent the worst op-
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erating environment with high cost, high penalty, and low
elasticity for spot transit. Specifically, we let r = 0.9r¯,
m = 1.5p¯, and γ = 1.1, and plot the spot transit price, profit
and surplus improvement with varying β in Figure 26-31. In
other words, these figures represent the minimum improve-
ment over a range of parameter values.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Relative spot transit cost
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 sp
ot
 p
ric
e
 
 
LINX
MSKIX
NIX
NYIIX
ESPANIX
HKIX
Figure 26: Worst-case price
with iso-elastic demand.
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Figure 27: Worst-case price
with linear demand.
We can see that with the worst combination of parame-
ters, spot transit is still slightly cheaper than regular tran-
sit for both demand models. The profit improvement stands
above 10%, and the surplus improvement is 5% with iso-
elastic demand and more than 60% with linear demand. The
results clear demonstrates that the advantage of spot transit
is robust against a wide range of parameter values, and spot
transit can be expected to provide significant gains in a typi-
cal operating environment.
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Figure 28: Worst-case
profit improvement with
iso-elastic demand.
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Figure 29: Worst-case sur-
plus improvement with iso-
elastic demand.
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Figure 30: Worst-case
profit improvement with
linear demand.
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Figure 31: Worst-case sur-
plus improvement with lin-
ear demand.
6. DISCUSSION OF FEASIBILITY
We have compellingly demonstrated, through both theo-
retical analysis and empirical evaluation based on real-world
traffic and price data, that spot transit provides significant fi-
nancial benefits to tier-1 ISPs and transit customers. How-
ever, profitability alone does not guarantee the feasibility of
spot transit. In this section, we examine some practical as-
pects that we believe are important to the establishment of
such a new transit settlement market.
6.1 Market infrastructure
In the spot transit market, customers can purchase and uti-
lize spot transit on-demand from tier-1 ISPs. This requires
a physically connected infrastructure amongst all customers
and the ISP. We believe this seemingly daunting task has, to
a large extent, been solved by the proliferation of network
exchange facilities, such as Internet Exchange Points (IXP)
and Network Access Points (NAP), across the world. They
host hundreds of ISPs each already, including tier-1 ISPs [4].
Though IXPs carry mostly peering traffic for now, the infras-
tructure can certainly be utilized to support spot transit with
little additional cost. Such a public infrastructure enables
tier-1 ISPs to support any customers present in the IXP, and
customers to flexibly switch between spot transit providers.
By supporting spot transit IXPs also diversify and expand its
business line.
In case the tier-1 ISP or the transit customer is not present
in an IXP, it is highly likely that a private link exists be-
tween the two for carrying regular transit. Spot transit can
then be provided over the existing private link. Even in the
extremely rare case that a new link has to be set up, such a
one-time cost is expected to be rather insignificant compared
to the long-term benefits of spot transit.
6.2 Inter-domain routing and billing
The introduction of spot transit traffic does not pose tech-
nical challenges or complications for inter-domain routing
of BGP (Border Gateway Protocol). Though it shares the
same network backbone with regular transit traffic, spot tran-
sit traffic can be easily identified and managed by a des-
ignated AS (Autonomous System) number acquired by the
tier-1 ISP. The ISP advertises routes with the designated AS
number when it supports spot transit, and stops doing so
when it does not wish to carry spot transit due to say in-
sufficient capacity or other considerations. Billing is also
straightforward by tracking traffic destined to the designated
AS number. No contract is required and only the used amount
of bandwidth is billed based on 95-th percentile billing or
any other suitable method. The spot transit bill can easily
be combined with the regular transit bill if the customer uses
both from the same tier-1 ISP.
6.3 Market cannibalization
One may be concerned that the tier-1 ISP’s regular transit
business would be negatively impacted by offering spot tran-
sit customers, resulting in the so-called market cannibaliza-
tion [2]. We have already shown that, the spot transit profit
is significantly larger than the profit collected from serving
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the elastic traffic with regular transit due to an increase of
demand as a result of price reduction. The demand increase
does not necessarily translate to a decrease of regular transit
demand. In fact we do not expect spot transit to be suitable
for the relatively inelastic traffic which finds regular transit
with SLAs more reliable.
The demand increase with spot transit can be explained
by at least two factors: competition with peering and transit
reselling. The low price and on-demand feature of spot tran-
sit can make it more appealing than peering or paid peering,
considering the performance benefits and network reacha-
bility provided by the tier-1 backbone. An ISP that relies
mostly on (paid) peering for cost reasons can utilize spot
transit for a portion of its elastic traffic with much better
reachability. Further, small ISPs usually find it difficult to
purchase transit directly from tier-1 ISPs due to the mini-
mum committed data rate requirement. They purchase tran-
sit from medium size ISPs that buy transit at bulk and resell
to these small customers. With spot transit, tier-1 ISPs are
able to collect additional profits from small ISPs by bypass-
ing the transit resellers in the middle. In all, we expect that
spot transit compliments rather than cannibalizes the tradi-
tional transit business of a tier-1 ISP.
7. RELATED WORK
An extensive literature exists on the Internet transit market
in both networking and economics. Two aspects are particu-
larly related to our work: optimal pricing design, and novel
market approaches for Internet transit.
Internet broadband access pricing generally is designed
and computed to optimize revenue, social welfare, or per-
formance. [29] argues that the predominant flat-rate pricing
structure for selling retail Internet access encourages waste
and is incompatible with service differentiation. [17,32] study
the benefits of usage-based pricing and argue that, with price
differentiation, one can use resources more efficiently. [10,
28] study Paris Metro Pricing in which service differentia-
tion and congestion control are autonomously achieved by
charging different prices for different service tiers that share
the same infrastructure. Time is another dimension to un-
bundle connectivity. Hande et al. [14] characterize the eco-
nomic loss due to the ISP’s inability or unwillingness to
price broadband access based on time of day. Jiang et al. [16]
study the optimal time-dependent prices for an ISP selling
broadband access based on solving optimization offline with
traffic estimates.
Our work is different in that we study pricing of spot tran-
sit, a new market for Internet transit. [21] proposes a Shapley
value based cooperative settlement between content, transit,
and eyeball ISPs. The focus is on performance and opti-
mality of the Internet ecosystem with selfish ISPs through
fair and efficient profit sharing. [38] proposes a clean-slate
market structure and routing protocol for exchange of In-
ternet paths. [9, 35, 39] are more related to our work. [39]
studies tiered pricing based on packet destinations and rout-
ing costs for selling Internet transit. It is shown that a few
tiers is enough to capture the optimal profit gain for a tier-1
ISP. From the customer’s perspective, [35] proposes to use
Tuangou (group buying), and [9] innovates T4P (transit for
peering) that provides partial transit to peering partners, to
reduce transit costs.
Spot transit is orthogonal to these novel settlement schemes,
and compliments them in that tiered pricing, Tuangou, and
T4P can be readily applied in spot transit market just like
they are used in the regular transit market. The benefits of
spot transit, as mentioned, depend on the very characteristics
of elastic traffic instead of the specifics of settlement details.
We use a simple model derived from [23,31] where demand
randomness is modeled additively. The technical distinction
is clear: we use a general demand function and analyze the
profit and surplus improvement, while [23, 31] only study
pricing based on a linear demand function.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we advocate to create a spot transit mar-
ket, where under-utilized backbone capacity is offered at dis-
counted to serve elastic traffic, and transit customers can pur-
chase transit on-demand. We systematically studied the pric-
ing and economical benefits of spot transit. Through both
theoretical analysis and empirical evaluation with real-world
price and traffic data, we demonstrated that significant profit
and surplus improvement can be generally expected from the
spot transit market. The gains are also robust for a wide
range of parameter settings. Given the potential economical
benefits, we believe spot transit will encourage many entities
to engage in this new market.
We conclude the paper by pointing out some interesting
open problems with the introduction of spot transit. For ex-
ample, how can the tier-1 ISP use smart traffic engineering
algorithms to provide better performance isolation between
the regular and spot transit traffic? How do we quantify the
effect of spot transit on novel settlement schemes such as
paid peering? How would it change the Internet AS level
topology, and the entire ecosystem?
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The risk-free profit Φ(p) = (p − r)d(p) is quasiconcave,
since p−r is monotonic and thus quasiconcave, d(p) is con-
cave and thus quasiconcave, and the product of two qua-
siconcave functions are quasiconcave. From (7) and (8),
the first-order derivative of the profit loss function Λ(p) is
d′(p)m
∫ B
C−d(p) f(u)du, which is increasing in p. Thus−Λ(p)
is concave in p. Since E[R(p)] = Φ(p) − Λ(p), it can be
readily shown that the sum of a quasiconcave function and a
concave function is quasiconcave.
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Since d¯(p) includes both inelastic and elastic traffic de-
mand, its elasticity is smaller, i.e. σ¯(p) < σ(p) for any p.
The first-order condition of (15) amounts to
p¯ = r¯ − d¯(p¯)
d¯′(p¯)
⇒ p¯ = r¯
1− σ¯(p¯)−1 (22)
by substituting (2). This implies that 1 < σ¯(p¯). At the op-
timal spot price p∗, d(p∗) < C always holds as discussed
in Sec. 3.3. Thus substituting (2) into (12), and applying
the one-sided Chebyshev Inequality (Chebyshev-Cantelli In-
equality) to upper bound Pr( > C − d(p∗)),
p∗ <
r
1− σ(p∗)−1 +ma, where a =
θ2
θ2 + (C − d(p∗)− µ)2 .
µ and θ are the mean and standard deviation of , respec-
tively. Now assume that p∗ ≥ p¯, which implies
r¯
1− σ¯(p¯)−1 <
r +ma
(
1− σ(p∗)−1)
1− σ(p∗)−1 .
1 < σ¯(p¯) ≤ σ¯(p∗) < σ(p∗) by (3), and 0 < 1 − σ¯(p¯)−1 <
1− σ(p∗)−1. Thus,
r¯ < r +ma
(
1− σ(p∗)−1) ,
which contradicts with condition (16).
C. PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Substituting (12) into (7),
E[R(p∗)] = (p∗−r)d(p∗)−m
∫ B
C−d(p∗)
(d(p∗)− C + u) f(u)du
> (p¯− r)d(p¯)−m
∫ B
C−d(p¯)
(d(p¯)− C + u) f(u)du
> (p¯− r)d(p¯)− (d(p¯)−C +B)m ·Pr ( > C − d(p¯))
The first inequality is due to the optimality of p∗, and the
second due to the fact that d(p¯) − C + B ≥ d(p¯) − C + u.
p∗ < p¯, thusE′[R(p¯)] < 0 due to quasiconcavity. From (11)
m · Pr (C − d(p¯)) < p¯+ d(p¯)
d′(p¯)
− r.
p¯+ d(p¯)d′(p¯) = r¯ from (22). Thus,
E[R(p∗)] > (p¯− r)d(p¯)− (d(p¯)− C +B)(r¯ − r)
= (p¯− r¯)d(p¯) + (r¯ − r)(d(p¯)− d(p¯) + C −B)
= E[R¯(p¯)] + (r¯ − r)(C −B).
C > B always holds as discussed in Sec. 3.3.
